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The Rise of Quasi-Common Carriers and
Conduit Convergence
ROB FRIEDEN
Abstract: The technologies that deliver content to consumers
have begun to merge into a single Internet-driven conduit.
Such convergence supports a consolidation of previously
stand-alone markets, as evidenced by the ability of ventures
to offer a "triple-play" bundle of Internet-delivered video,
data, and telephone services. Converging technologies and
markets eliminate a sharp and identifiable distinction
between the service classifications created by Congress and
applied by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "Commission"). The Commission faces a regulatory
quandary in maintaining a clear dichotomy between carriers
operating as private conduits versus carriers subject to
government oversight. The former can deliver content,
software, and services largely free of government regulation,
while some in the latter category operate as common carriers
bearing public utility obligations and others incur FCC-
mandates to carry video content and place it on particular
channel locations.
This paper will examine whether and how
converging technologies and markets provide an opportunity
for the FCC to impose more types of quasi-common carrier
duties on ventures that otherwise would qualify for limited
or no regulation. Two D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases
provide conflicting guidance. The court affirmed an FCC
requirement that all cellphone companies provide
subscribers of other carriers "roaming" access to data
services, despite the classification of Internet access as a
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largely unregulated information service. However, the court
overturned an attempt by the FCC to sanction an
information service provider for interfering with how some
of its subscribers downloaded content via the company's
Internet links. Other pertinent cases provide examples where
courts have affirmed FCC decisions to impose quasi-common
carrier duties, such as the mandatory carriage of local
broadcast television signals.
The FCC has found ways to impose limited, quasi-
common carrier duties on ventures providing convergent
services even though these ventures appear to qualify for
little, if any, regulation. The FCC may lawfully respond to
changed circumstances and the rigidity of congressionally
crafted service definitions. However, such flexibility
generates regulatory uncertainty and the potential for the
Commission to exceed its statutory authority. The paper
concludes that the FCC will consider applying quasi-common
carrier duties on private carriers despite its uncertainty
about the legally permissible reach of this option.
I. INTRODUCTION
The technologies that deliver information, communications, and
entertainment ("ICE") to consumers have begun to merge into a single
Internet-driven conduit. Such convergence supports consolidation of
previously stand-alone markets as evidenced by the ability of ventures
to offer a "triple-play" bundle of Internet-delivered video content,
broadband access, and telephone services. Converging technologies
and markets eliminate a sharp and identifiable distinction between
the service classifications created by Congress and applied by the
Federal Communications Commission. Heretofore, the FCC has
created a bright-line regulatory dichotomy between carriers operating
as private conduits and ones having the duty to provide access to other
carriers and the public subject to government oversight. The former
can deliver content, software, and services largely free of government
regulation, while the latter operate as common carriers' bearing public
utility obligations, such as the duty to provide service in a
nondiscriminatory manner.
1Title II of the Communications Act imposes a number of requirements on
telecommunications service providers including the duty to operate without
discrimination, to interconnect with other carriers, and to provide service to all qualified
consumers. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2012).
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The Commission also now experiences difficulty in maintaining a
clear dichotomy between regulated2 telecommunications services3 and
largely unregulated information services,4 particularly when a single
venture provides both types of services. For example, the FCC failed to
secure judicial affirmance of its decision to sanction a wire-based
Internet Service Provider ("ISP") for using software to identify a
certain type of subscriber traffic and subject it to techniques designed
to interfere with the successful delivery of content. In Comcast Corp.
v. F.C.C., 6oo F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the FCC lacked direct statutory authority to
assert jurisdiction and impose nondiscrimination requirements
analogous to that imposed on common carriers.s The court also
2 Telecommunications carriers have "[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service,
nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the
requirements of this section and section 252 of this title. An incumbent local exchange
carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting
carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service."
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2012); see also Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First report and Order, ii F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996),
affd in part, rev'd in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15
F.C.C.R. 3696 (1999), rev'd and remanded, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d
415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
3 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, defines telecommunications service as
"the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of
users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47
U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012). Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received." Id. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50).
Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, imposes a variety of common carriers
responsibilities on telecommunications service providers including the duty to operate in a
nondiscriminatory manner and to interconnect with other carriers on fair terms and
conditions. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-231 (2012).
4 Information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of
any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications
system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). These
services qualify for a largely unregulated status.
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rejected attempts by the FCC to assert ancillary jurisdiction based on
an expansive reading of the Commission's general authority to serve
the public interest.6
Additionally, the FCC has confronted instances where carriers
provide an array of services that appear to include both private carrier
information services, such as broadband access, and common carrier
services, such as conventional voice telephone service. Consumers
with a wireless and wireline broadband Internet connection can
subscribe to retail voice telephone service, commonly referred to as
Voice over the Internet Protocol ("VolP")7 service, as well as Internet
Protocol Television ("IPTV"), 8 a service that delivers video content to
5 "In this case the Commission cites ... [no section in the Communications Act of 1934] to
shed light on any express statutory delegation of authority found in Title II, III, VI, or, for
that matter, anywhere else." Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 6oo F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
[hereinafter, Comcast Reversal].
6"The Commission therefore rests its assertion of authority over Comcast's network
management practices on the broad language of section 4(i) of the Act: 'The Commission
may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions,'
Comcast Reversal, 6oo F. 3d at 645 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) and Formal Complaint of
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-
Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,036, (2008)).
Despite the strong language in the reversal of the FCC's sanctions on Comcast, the FCC
announced a new open Internet policy initiative. See Preserving the Open Internet, GN
Docket No. o9-191, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (2oo). The Commission has
attempted to bolster its claims to statutory authority and also establishes less burdensome
network neutrality obligations on ISPs with exceptions made for reasonable network
management, specialized services, and wireless access. Predictably even the FCC's revised
rules have triggered an appeal that includes a new argument that nondiscrimination rules
would unconstitutionally impede ISPs' First Amendment speaker rights. See Verizon v.
F.C.C., Case No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
7 VoIP is the real-time carriage and delivery of data packets that correspond to voice. VoIP
services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both computers and ordinary
telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP works, see Susan Spradley &
Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges, Associated with the Evolution to VoIP,
FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.fec.gov/events/ tutorial-technical-challenges-
associated-evolution-voip. See generally Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos,
Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New
World ofIntermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2008).
8 IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files or
view (streaming) video content on an immediate "real time" basis. Sky Angel U.S., LLC,
Emergency Petition for Temporary Standstill, DA 10-679, 25 F.C.C.R. 3879 (2010). Some
of the available content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive, therein
triggering disputes over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution
agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. "Sky
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computer monitors, tablets, and smartphones that duplicates or
augments what broadcast, cable, and satellite television companies
offer. These two services provide a competitive alternative to regulated
services, but do not trigger the same level of government oversight.
Converging technologies can accrue cost savings as well as an
expanded ability to extract value from a broadband connection. An
additional benefit may flow to carriers if they can leverage the ability
to provide convergent services with fewer or no regulatory burdens.
The FCC has evidenced a willingness to apply the least-burdensome
regulatory classification to ventures offering services that combine
elements that might trigger two or more different regulatory
classifications. For example, the FCC opted to treat all forms of
broadband access as information services,9 despite a credible
argument that a severable bit transmission component exists. While
the FCC initially recognized this separate element, when it classified
DSL service as a telecommunications service,1o it subsequently
reclassified DSL as entirely an information service." Similarly, the
Angel has been providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for
approximately two and a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet,
Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that
these channels are a significant part of its service offering." Id. at 3879-80. For background
on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The Regulatory Classification ofInternet Protocol Television:
How the Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain From Cable Service
Regulation and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAw CONSPECrUS 199 (2009).
9 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4821(2002),
affd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
977-78 (2005); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,863 (2oo5) [hereinafter, DSL Reclassification
Order], petition for rev. den., Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. F.C.C., 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2007); United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the
Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information
Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281 (2006); Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks,
Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007).
10 "[B]ecause facilities-based providers of wireline broadband Internet access service are
subject to legacy regulation, we must consider that legacy regulation in determining the
appropriate regulatory framework for wireline broadband Internet access service
providers." DSL Reclassification Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14856.
11 The FCC reclassified DSL as an information service in part to maintain regulatory parity
with the services, such as cable modem and Internet broadband access. "By classifying both
wireline broadband Internet access service and cable modem service as information
services, and by adopting the attached NPRM, we move closer to crafting an analytical
framework that is consistent, to the extent possible, across multiple platforms that support
competing services." DSL Reclassification Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14865.
2014] 475
476 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 9:3
FCC has not imposed regulatory burdens on IPTV service providers,
despite the fact that these ventures provide a competitive alternative
to broadcast, satellite, and cable television. The Commission has
allowed regulatory asymmetry to occur, apparently disinclined to
apply equal levels of government oversight between competing
ventures.
However, in another instance the FCC refrained from making a
specific regulatory classification, but nevertheless imposed many
burdens to achieve regulatory parity. The Commission has imposed
several regulatory burdens on VoIP service providers that historically
have applied only to regulated common carrier telephone
companies.12 Such selective and variable application of regulatory
oversight may evidence prudent flexibility in response to different
carrier and market characteristics. On the other hand, it may
represent inconsistent and arbitrary decision making likely to cause
regulatory uncertainty and an unlevel competitive playing field.
The onset of VoIP and IPTV services, as well as carrier
combinations of regulated telecommunications services with largely
unregulated information services, has presented the FCC with a
regulatory quandary. The Commission prefers to apply a single, least-
burdensome regulatory classification to ventures, even ones providing
convergent services.13 Alternatively, the FCC refrains from making an
12 See, e.g., Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming FCC
regulatory oversight of VoIP and preempting state deregulation or inconsistent regulation);
Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring interconnected VolP service
providers to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); Vonage Holdings Corp. v. F.C.C.,
489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming the FCC's decision to require VoIP operators to
contribute to universal service funds); In re Implementation of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996; Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network
Information and Other Customer Information; IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 6927 (2007) (extending customer
proprietary network information obligations to interconnected VoIP service providers),
affd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecom. Assoc. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
Matters of Local Number Portability Porting Interval and Validation, Report and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 6953 (2010) (establishing fast deadlines for migrating a telephone service
subscriber to and from VolP service); The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the
Commission's Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet
Protocol Service Providers and Broadband Internet Service Providers, Report and Order, 27
F.C.C.R. 2650 (2012) (requiring VolP carriers to report service outages).
3 "[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] indicate that
the drafters ... regarded telecommunications services and information services as
mutually exclusive categories." Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to
Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522 (1998); see also Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota
Public Utilities Com'n, 290 F. Supp.2d 993, 994, looo (D. Minn. 2003) (applying the
FCC's dichotomy).
explicit determination into which regulatory classification certain
convergent services fit, e.g., VoIP and IPTV. Perhaps this strategy
reserves the maximum possible flexibility to the FCC, so that it can
respond to changed circumstances and selectively apply or refrain
from applying regulatory requirements. However, the lack of clarity
generates regulatory uncertainty.
On the other hand, the FCC has learned that making an all-
encompassing regulatory determination may rob it of powers it
subsequently may need. For example, in 2002, the Commission
determined that retail broadband access to the Internet provided by
cable television companies constituted a largely unregulated
information service.14 When the Commission received complaints that
a provider of cable modem service acted on its incentive and ability to
interfere with the downloading activities of certain subscribers, the
FCC sanctioned the ISP, but an appellate court reversed on grounds
that the Commission lacked a direct statutory basis to fashion a lawful
remedy.15
FCC managers may have regretted the decision to unconditionally
apply the information service classification to telephone, cable, and
wireless carriers that add broadband to their list of offered services.
Instead of having direct statutory authority to assert jurisdiction, the
FCC has had to come up with creative ways to identify indirect, but
lawful authority. The FCC has generated a mixed record with appellate
courts when it uses creative statutory interpretation to justify new
regulation, or re-regulation of previously deregulated ventures such as
broadband Internet access providers. The FCC has had greater success
when it adroitly refrains from making a classification, e.g., for VoIP16
14 See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002), affd, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
15 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13,028 (20o8), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 6oo F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
16 The FCC has managed to avoid making a specific regulatory classification ofVoIP,
despite having imposed Title II regulatory requirements. To date, the Commission has not
classified interconnected VoIP service as either an information service or a
telecommunications service. The Commission has, however, extended certain obligations
to providers of such service, including local number portability, 911 emergency calling
capability, universal service contribution, CPNI protection, disability access, TRS
contribution requirements, and section 214 discontinuance obligations. Connect America
Fund, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26
F.C.C.R. 4554, 4582 (2011) (citations omitted).
2014] FRIEDEN 477
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
and IPTV, but eventually a conflict may force it to make a
determination.
One such conflict that may force the FCC to act lies in the extent to
which the Commission has lawful authority to require carriers to
interconnect facilities. Common carriers incur such a duty, but the
FCC generally allows private carriers to determine whether
commercial interests support interconnection with a specific carrier.
ISPs use commercially driven interconnection arrangements17 to
secure all needed pathways for providing subscribers with complete
access to content available anywhere within the Internet cloud.18 On
the other hand, the FCC has decided that it should mandate carrier
interconnections for both wireless voice and data services, based on
the determination that rural carriers could not secure all needed
interconnections with bigger, urban carriers. Without such
interconnections, the FCC believes rural carriers would lack the ability
to ensure that their subscribers could make and receive telephone,
text, and Internet services when located outside of their home
territory, a status commonly referred to as roaming.19
Additionally, the FCC imposed a form of interconnection
agreement between television broadcasters and cable television
operators when the Commission required the latter to carry all
significantly viewed local television channels, a duty called "must-
17 'Currently, agreements for the exchange of Internet traffic are unregulated and left solely
to commercial negotiation between Internet backbone providers. Agreements for the
exchange of traffic between operators are called 'peering agreements' and depending on the
balance of traffic, it maybe either free or paid. Other arrangements provide that one
network will carry traffic without exchanging traffic on that network link. This will involve
payment, and such service is called 'transit."' Daniel L. Brenner & Winston Maxwell, The
Network Neutrality and the Netflix Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for Content Providers
in Europe and the United States, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 5 (Mar. 2011).
18 The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the
Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content
available via these networks. "The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the
role of the personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of 'cloud computing'-
the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider's computers over the
Internet, rather than on a person's desktop computer." William Jeremy Robison, Free at
What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1195, 1199 (Apr. 2olo).
19 Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers
and Other Providers of Mobile-data Services, Second Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 5411
(2011), affd sub. nom. Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 7oo F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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carry."20 Note that the FCC imposed compulsory regulatory duties on
cable television companies even before receiving explicit statutory
2oTurner Brdest. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 18o (1997) (must-carry requirement imposed on cable
television operators using an intermediate scrutiny standard and concluding that carriage
requirements are reasonable and not content-based in that they promote the financial
viability of television broadcasters and not any specific type of content). See also, Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994); Satellite Brdcst. & Comm. Ass'n v. FCC,
275 F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001) (carry-one carry-all rule mandated by the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act); Nissa Laughner & Justin Brown, Cable Operators'Fifth
Amendment Claims Applied to Digital Must-Carry, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 281, 305 (2oo6).
Note that must-carry obligations impose a duty for cable operators to carry duplicative or
possibly undesirable content. See, e.g., Cablevision Systems Corp. v. F.C.C. 570 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir. 2009) (rejecting First Amendment claims and affirming the FCC decision requiring
compulsory carriage of upstate New York broadcast television station by a cable operator
on Long Island).
Additional carriage responsibilities apply specifically to Comcast when the FCC
conditionally authorized the company's acquisition of NCB-Universal. Applications of
Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to
Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238 (2011) [hereinafter, Approval of Comcast Acquisition
ofNBC Universal]. The FCC requires Comcast to negotiate fairly with unaffiliated content
providers for the carriage of their content. "In light of the significant additional
programming Comcast will control--programming that may compete with third-party
programming Comcast carries on its MVPD service--we require that Comcast not
discriminate in video programming distribution on the basis of affiliation or non-affiliation
with Comcast-NBCU." Id. 26 F.C.C.R. at 4241. Additionally, the FCC "require[s] that, if
Comcast 'neighborhoods' its news (including business news) channels, it must include all
unaffiliated news (or business news) channels in that neighborhood." Approval of Comcast
Acquisition of NBC Universal, 26 F.C.C.R. at 4241.
Within one year of its merger approval, the FCC launched an investigation whether
Comcast violated a condition by refusing to assign Bloomberg Television a channel
assignment in the same "community" of channels assigned to similar news and business
news networks. Bloomberg L.P., Complainant v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,
Defendant, MB Docket No. 11-104, DA 12-694, 27 F.C.C.R. 4891 (2012) (granting in part a
Bloomberg's complaint that its 24-hour business news channel, Bloomberg Television, is
an "independent news channel" covered by the "news neighborhooding" condition adopted
in the conditional approval of Comcast's acquisition of NBC Universal).
The FCC also determined that Comcast engaged in discriminatory treatment of the
unaffiliated Tennis channel by making that content available on a comparatively more
expensive and lightly subscribed sports programming tier, as compared to the carriage on a
cheaper and heavily subscribed tier for the Comcast-owned Golf channel. Tennis Channel,
Inc., Complainant v. Comcast Cable Communications, L.L.C., Defendant, MB Docket No.
10-204, File No. CSR-8258-P, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 27 F.C.C.R. 8508 (2012),
pet.for stay den. 27 F.C.C.R. 9274 (2012).
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authority based on an assertion that the rules fit within the ambit of
the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction and would serve the public interest.21
Compulsory interconnection between conduit operators such as
wireless broadband carriers and cable television operators manifests
some, but not all, of the characteristics of common carriage. The FCC
imposes a compulsory duty to interconnect, but allows the parties to
negotiate commercially driven terms and conditions for such carriage.
One could characterize this arrangement as quasi-common carriage,
because the FCC mandates a duty to interconnect, albeit lacking some
of the traditional array of common carrier duties such as the
obligation to disclose the terms and to offer the same price to
everyone seeking the same sort of interconnection. Reviewing courts
have accepted the FCC's rationales for imposing quasi-common
carrier obligations, as well as explanations on how these duties do not
constitute the complete, functional equivalence of common carriage.
This paper will examine whether and how converging technologies
and markets provide an opportunity for the FCC to impose more
forms of quasi-common carrier duties on ventures that otherwise
would qualify for limited or no regulation. This option appears
bolstered by a recent court affirmance of the FCC's requirement that
cellphone companies provide roaming access for data services in
addition to several prior instances where appellate courts have
validated quasi-common carrier duties. On the other hand, the FCC
recently failed to secure affirmance when it sanctioned an Internet
Service Provider for interfering with the content downloading
activities of some subscribers. The paper concludes that the FCC has
found a way to impose limited, quasi-common carrier duties on
ventures providing convergent services, even though these ventures
appear to qualify for little, if any, regulation in their capacity as
information service providers.
II. THE QUASI-COMMON CARRIER OPTION
Technological innovations and converging ICE markets combine
to make even more difficult the FCC's statutory responsibility of
classifying new services. The Commission has to interpret and apply
broad service definitions crafted by Congress. The definitions
contained in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, trigger
significantly different regulatory responsibilities that can affect a
venture's cost of doing business, its competitiveness, flexibility in
21 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-178 (1968).
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responding to changed marketplace conditions, and incentives to
invest in new infrastructure. The FCC has responded in different and
sometimes unpredictable ways. If the Commission wants to showcase
deregulatory and pro-marketplace inclinations, it will apply the least
burdensome regulatory classification to new services and allow that
classification to replace more burdensome, preexisting classifications.
This scenario played out when the FCC applied the information
service classification to all forms of retail and broadband access,
including the revocation of the telecommunications service
classification previously applied to DSL service. If the FCC wants to
act more cautiously, it will attempt to avoid making a regulatory
classification altogether, while incrementally applying regulatory
requirements, if deemed necessary. This scenario has occurred with
gradual increases in the type and number of rules and duties VoIP
carriers must follow if they provide a service that interconnects with
conventional wired and wireless telephone networks.
Additionally, the FCC may attempt to secure a consent decree,
having little precedential value, when a venture engages in
anticompetitive or fraudulent behavior, but the Commission may lack
direct statutory authority to impose a fine or mandate compliance
with common carrier rules. Rather than articulate how it had
jurisdiction to impose compulsory nondiscrimination rules over DSL
services provided by a telephone company, the FCC secured a
voluntary forfeiture from the company and a commitment from it not
to block subscribers from accessing VoIP service via the company's
DSL link.22 The FCC also secured a voluntary $25 million dollar
payment from Verizon when, for a period spanning over four years,
the company billed wireless customers for Internet access triggered
inadvertently by pushing a button on some types of handsets.23 The
FCC invoked the nondiscrimination requirement imposed on common
carriers by Section 201(b) of the Communications Act 2 4 and truth in
billing requirements25 similarly limited to common carriers, without
22 Madison River Communications, L.L.C., Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (Inf. Bur. 2005)
(small independent telephone company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and
consent decree agreeing not to block Digital Subscriber Line customers' access to Voice
over the Internet Protocol telephone services).
23 Verizon Wireless Data Usage Charges, Order (2010) (consent decree requiring the refund
of $52.8 million to customers and a voluntary payment of $25 million to the federal
government for improper data charges).
24 47 U.S.C. § 2ol(b) (2012).
25 47 C.F.R. § 64.2401(2012).
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explaining how such authority applies when a common carrier
provides private carrier information services such as access to the
Internet.
The FCC has learned the hard way that showcasing broad
sweeping deregulatory pronouncements may trigger quite harmful
consequences. Having deregulated broadband information services,
the FCC lacked direct statutory authority to sanction Comcast when it
engaged in what appeared to be anticompetitive and discriminatory
conduct. The Commission could have conferred conditional or partial
deregulation of information services, making it much easier for it to
impose still necessary safeguards. Instead the Commission has
resorted to novel interpretations of statutory authority, claims of
decision-making expertise worthy of deference by appellate courts,
and expansion of its ancillary jurisdiction based on indirect statutory
authority. A combination of these three tactics has helped the FCC
justify imposing regulatory requirements that it claims do not
constitute common carriage, even as they impose elements of this
classification.
III. CREATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Having deregulated retail broadband Internet access, the FCC has
subsequently concluded that it still needs to serve as a referee to
resolve ISP disputes and to safeguard consumers against the
possibility that an ISP would engage in anticompetitive practices. The
FCC has attempted to backtrack from its previous statutory
interpretation concluding that the information service should
predominate, even for services having an identifiable
telecommunications component that ISPs use to link subscribers with
26 "The Commission ... may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two conditions are
satisfied: (i) the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities." Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F-3d at 646 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v.
FCC, 4o6 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). "Title I of the Act gives the Commission
ancillary jurisdiction over matters reasonably related to 'the effective performance of [its]
various responsibilities' where the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the
service." Universal Service Contribution Methodology; A National Broadband Plan for Our
Future, WC Docket No. o6-122, GN Docket No. 09-51, 27 F.C.C.R. 5357, 5458 (2012)
(quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700 (1979); and citing United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-178 (1968); Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
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the Internet cloud. The FCC initially opted to subordinate the bit
transmission function by emphasizing the difference between
providing telecommunications as element in a composite service,
predominated by its information service characteristics, and the
offering of telecommunications on a standalone, retail basis.27 Later,
former FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski floated the possibility of
upgrading the importance of the telecommunications component with
an eye toward carving out a telecommunication service instead of
subordinating it within a single information service classification.28
In light of the possibility that a reviewing court might not defer to
the FCC's reconsideration on the severability and significance of
telecommunications, the Commission has generated additional
statutory justifications for having jurisdiction over information
services. In a proposal to create and enforce open-access rules, that
would bar the kinds of discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct in
which Comcast was alleged to have engaged, the FCC invoked several
sections of the Communications Act, including Sec. 706.29 While this
section explicitly calls upon the FCC to promote national access to
advanced telecommunications capability, the Commission now
interprets this section as authorizing it to create and enforce rules
pertaining to the behavior of ISPs.30 An appellate court might not
27 See Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of
Information Services, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373, 373-423 (2008); Rob
Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons
From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 247, 247-296 (2006).
28 See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, The Third Way: A
Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), available at:
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-297944Ai.doc (proposing to
apply Title II regulation only to the bit transmission portion of ISP services and rejecting a
renewed attempt to find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying all
aspects of Internet access as a telecommunications service); see also Austin Schlick,
General Counsel, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, A Third-Way Legal Framework forAddressing
the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fec.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A.doc (providing legal
rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over
Internet access).
29 See Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17, 968 (2010).
Section 706 is reproduced in the notes to Section 157 of the Communications Act of 1934.
47 U.S.C. § 157 notes.
30 The FCC inferred that Section 706 of the 1996 Act confers broad authority to revise the
scope of regulatory oversight to promote Internet access. As noted, Section 706 of the 1996
Act directs the Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions that encourage
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defer to the FCC's statutory interpretation, concluding instead that the
Commission has engaged in results-driven decision making, i.e., to
find sections in the Communications Act that possibly have sufficient
ambiguity to support the Commission's newfound interest in
overseeing the telecommunications aspects of broadband Internet
access.
IV. DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S EXPERTISE
The FCC has generated a mixed record on securing deference to its
expertise by appellate courts. On the matter of asserting jurisdiction
over information services, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily rejected the FCC's attempt to sanction Comcast for
interfering with the traffic downloading by some subscribers.31 Having
determined that the FCC lacked direct statutory authority to regulate
an information service provider, the court also refused to accept
arguments that the Commission had ancillary jurisdiction based on its
broad authority to regulate providers of wire and radio services.32 The
court could not identify an ambiguous statute that the FCC could
reasonably interpret to justify its intervention.
the deployment of "advanced telecommunications capability." ... Under Section 706(a),
the Commission must encourage the deployment of such capability by "utilizing, in a
manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity," various tools
including "measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment." Preserving
the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. at 17, 968.
31 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 6oo F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC lacked direct statutory
authority to impose sanctions on an Internet Service Provider for interfering with the
traffic downloading of some subscribers).
32 "In this case we must decide whether the Federal Communications Commission has
authority to regulate an Internet service provider's network management practices.
Acknowledging that it has no express statutory authority over such practices, the
Commission relies on section 4 (i) of the Communications Act of 1934, which authorizes the
Commission to 'perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.' 47 U.S.C. § 154 (i). The Commission may exercise this'ancillary' authority only if
it demonstrates that its action-here barring Comcast from interfering with its customers'
use of peer-to-peer networking applications-is 'reasonably ancillary to the . .. effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.' Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406
F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Commission has failed to make that showing. It relied
principally on several Congressional statements of policy, but under Supreme Court and
D.C. Circuit case law statements of policy, by themselves, do not create 'statutorily
mandated responsibilities.'" Comcast Corp., 6oo F.3d at 644.
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However, the very same D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did defer to
the FCC's statutory interpretation on another matter involving ISPs.
In Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 70o F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012),33 the
court accepted the FCC's rationale that it could regulate narrow
aspects of how wireless carriers provide data service. The FCC ordered
all cellular radiotelephone companies to interconnect their wireless
data networking capabilities so that users temporarily located outside
their home service territory could continue to access Internet services.
Previously, the FCC had ordered these companies to provide voice
telephone service to "roaming" users so that these visitors could
continue to make and receive calls.34 The FCC has statutory authority
to mandate voice roaming interconnection, because Title II of the
Communications Act directly applies to these carriers who operate as
common carriers, and who offer Title II regulated telecommunications
services. The duty to interconnect with other carriers constitutes one
of the basic nondiscrimination and accessibility requirements
contained in Title II of the Communications Act and applicable to
common carners.
On the other hand, cellphone company provision of wireless
broadband data services does not trigger Title II FCC regulatory
authority, because the Commission determined that such an
undertaking constitutes an information service.35 Notwithstanding the
FCC's clear inability to impose Title II common carrier
responsibilities, the court accepted the FCC's assertion that
compulsory roaming service was reasonable and did not constitute the
unlawful imposition of a common carrier responsibility when applied
to wireless data service.
The court deferred to the FCC's expertise and ability to
differentiate between common carrier responsibilities and what one
could call quasi-common carrier responsibilities that impose a duty to
deal: "[C]ommon carriage is not all or nothing-there is a grey area in
33 Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 7oo F-3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012) [hereinafter, Data Roaming
Affirmance].
34 Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications
Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981).
35 "The Commission has previously determined and here concedes that wireless internet
service both is an 'information service' and is not a [Title II regulated] 'commercial mobile
service.'. . . Accordingly, mobile-data providers are statutorily immune, perhaps twice
over, from treatment as common carriers." Data Roaming Affirmance, 700 F.3d at 538.
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which, although a given regulation might be applied to common
carriers, the obligations imposed are not common carriage per se." 36
The court noted that the FCC had not required the wireless
carriers to offer roaming access on a uniform basis. Instead, the FCC
required only that the carriers negotiate "commercially reasonable"37
agreements that could take into consideration specific circumstances
presented by each roaming access request, including the possibility of
not having to provide service if technically infeasible.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals appears comfortable with the
application of different Titles of the Communications Act to a single
carrier when it provides different services resulting in "a bifurcated
regulatory scheme."38 The FCC has evidenced less comfort, however,
in subjecting a single venture to varying degrees of regulatory
oversight.39 The Commission may have concluded that any and all
retail broadband service qualifies as an information service, based on
its disinclination to make nuanced decisions whether and how to
impose narrow requirements such as data roaming. Now, having
made this type of narrow decision and having received judicial
approval, the FCC might have a renewed inclination to selectively
expand its regulatory wingspan. Perhaps anticipating this motive, the
court suggests that if a carrier considers itself fettered with a true
common carrier burden, it "is free to return to court with an 'as
applied' challenge."40 The unconditional ("facial") challenge presented
by Verizon allowed the court to affirm the FCC, because the court
could infer at least some instances where the Commission could
lawfully impose the data roaming rules.
The court noted that wireless carriers use radio spectrum, thereby
triggering aspects of Title III of the Communications Act. Because the
FCC persists in its desire to impose open access rules on both wireless
36 Id. at 547.
37 Id. at 537. "[A]lthough the rule bears some marks of common carriage, we defer to the
Commission's determination that the rule imposes no common carrier obligations on
mobile-internet providers." Id.
38 Id. at 538.
39 "[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] indicate that
the drafters ... regarded telecommunications services and information services as
mutually exclusive categories." Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to
Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522 (1998); see also Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp.2d
at 994, looo (applying the FCC's dichotomy).
40 Data Roaming Affirmance, 700 F.3d at 549.
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and wireline ISPs, the possibility exists that a reviewing court,
considering both the Comcast and Cellco cases, would deem the FCC
as going too far on the quasi-common carrier track by imposing the
same burdens on ISPs using closed circuit copper and fiber optic
cables in lieu of spectrum. Without a direct link to both Title II and
III, the Commission would have to rely heavily on the already
discredited strategy of invoking ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of
the Communications Act.
V. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
The FCC has also generated a mixed record of claiming lawful
authority to regulate activities not explicitly identified in the
Communications Act. A deferential court will accept the argument
that changed circumstances, such as technological innovations,
present the FCC with new challenges for which it has expertise to
address. For example, faced with market entry by cable television
operators, and their ability to fragment broadcast television audiences
and possibly impede the ongoing commercial viability of the
advertiser supported broadcast television business model, the FCC
imposed significant restrictions on what content cable television
operators could offer. Several reviewing courts affirmed the FCC's
action, despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization.41
Courts allowed the FCC to impose restrictions, such as limits on
the carriage of distant broadcast television signals and the "must
carry" duty to deliver local stations based on the Commission's expert
determination that they supported the public interest in continuing to
have television broadcasters capable of surviving new competitive
threats. Because the FCC understood its Title III mandate to sustain
41 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See also FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v. Midwest Video Corp.
(Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972). "The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over
cable. To reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the Commission found that cable
was within its primary statutory grant of authority under section 152(a) of the
[Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate 'all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio.' Second, the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act,
which allows the Commission to issue'such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as 'public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires.' The FCC also referenced section 15 4(i), which provides that '[t]he
Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions.'" Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572
(Mar. 2010) (citations omitted).
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commercial broadcasting, it could invoke the broad public interest
mandate to oversee any use of wire and radio contained in Title I to
permit it to establish regulatory safeguards42 that affected how cable
television operators could provide service, despite the fact that they
did not use spectrum and did not operate as common carriers.
More recently the FCC has won judicial affirmance of several
decisions to impose quasi-common carrier responsibilities on
providers of Voice over the Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services,
despite never having explicitly decided that these carriers provide
telecommunications services subject to Title II common carrier
regulation. Unlike the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the
Comcast case, which refused to defer to the FCC's decision, the Cellco
case validated the FCC's assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. Using the
two pronged test established in Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),43 the court concluded
that: i) the FCC could lawfully assess the scope of its authority to
manage radio spectrum broadly conferred to it by Title III of the
Communications Act; and 2) the Commission interpretation resulting
in data roaming negotiation and interconnection requirements was
reasonable.
VI. CASE PRECEDENTS SUPPORTING THE QUASI-COMMON CARRIAGE
OPTION
While the D.C. Circuit did not cite cases supporting the FCC's
imposition of quasi-common carrier data roaming duties, ample
precedent exists. In addition to its validation of mandatory broadcast
television channel carriage, the Supreme Court previously affirmed
the FCC requirement that cable operators make available a portion of
their channel capacity for carriage of content generated by residents.44
Additional cable inventory earmarked for uses not controlled by cable
operators include the provision of public access, education, and
government ("PEG") channels, as contained in the franchising
42 The FCC has authority to promulgate regulations "reasonably ancillary to the ... effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities." Am. Library Ass'n. v. FCC, 406
F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
43 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 4o6 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC authority to
require cable operators to provide channel capacity for local origination).
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agreement with a locality,45 and the FCC requirement that cable
operators make available channel capacity for lease by third parties
and competing content providers.46
In certain instances cable operators even lose complete control
over where in their inventory of channels they can place a specific
network, particularly one that competes with a corporate affiliate. For
example, Comcast offered to locate the content of competitors on the
same programming tier, and in some instances, in the same
neighborhood of channel numberS47 as concessions to secure FCC
approval of the company's merger with NBC-Universal.48
To promote efficient and timely installation of cable television
networks, Congress mandated that public utilities share access to their
poles and conduits on a fully compensatory, even if profit maximizing
basis.49 This duty to share pole space arguably provides an example of
quasi-common carriage, because public utilities have to share a facility
with ventures not involved in any aspect of their line of business. The
public utilities are not interconnecting lines with similarly situated
utilities, but instead have to provide access to a facility they previously
used exclusively to deliver their service.
45 However, a reviewing court determined that the FCC lacked statutory authority to
impose PEG carriage responsibilities. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th
Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). An amendment to the Communications Act in 1984
authorizes local government authorities to establish these requirements as part of a service
franchise agreement. See 47 U.S.C. § 531(a)-(c); § 541(a)(4)(B).
46 See Leased Commercial Access, 23 F.C.C.R. 2909 (2008).
47 Bloomberg L.P., Complainant v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Defendant MB
Docket No. 11-104, Memorandum Opinion and Order, DA 12-694, 55 Communications
Reg. (P&F) 1255, 2012 WL 1564561 (rel. May 2, 2012) (requiring Comcast to locate
Bloomberg Television in the channel vicinity assigned to other news and business news
networks).
48 See Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal,
Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-
56, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238 (2011). Note that this voluntary concession to locate video content
does not necessarily support FCC authority to mandate such carriage. In Comcast Cable
Comms., Inc. v. F.C.C., 717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the FCC's decision to require Comcast to carry both a sport network it owned and
a competitor on the same programming tier.
49 The Pole Attachments Act, 92 Stat. 35, as amended, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2010).
See also FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (mandatory pole attachment
access by cable companies not deemed a taking when rates are fully compensatory and
reasonable).
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In one previous instance, the FCC secured a significant "voluntary
contribution" from a wireless information service provider for
erroneous billing, despite the questionable applicability of Title II
common carrier duties.so The Commission determined that Verizon
Wireless had wrongly charged customers for unintentional and often
unconnected Internet calls triggered by the inadvertent pressing of a
button on certain wireless handsets. Because the FCC's action
occurred in the context of a Consent Decree, the Commission did not
have to explain the legal basis for its action. The FCC merely stated
that the parties had resolved the Commission's investigation into
whether Verizon had fully complied with Section 201(b) of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), which prohibits
unreasonable charges and practices, and Section 64.2401 of the
Commission Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2401, which imposes Truth in
Billing requirements. Verizon agreed to refund $52.8 million to
subscribers that it had erroneously billed over a lengthy period and to
make a voluntary $25 million contribution to the U.S. treasury.
Depending on one's perspective, the FCC has shown how to
confront changed circumstances with reasonable flexibility, or has
used expedient tactics to expand its regulatory wingspan when it
creates new duties for private carriers. Some will applaud the FCC for
making midcourse corrections in the face of technological and
marketplace changes, as well as remedies to its own miscalculations
and misreading of statutory mandates. But others will chide the FCC
for toggling between deregulation and marketplace intrusions without
consistency and necessary discipline.5'
VII. MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS
When the FCC creates quasi-common carrier duties, it arguably
has responded to changed circumstances warranting its intervention,
including changes in policies, rules, and spectrum allocations. The
50 Verizon Wireless Data Usage Charges, 25 F.C.C.R. 15105 (2010).
51 Justice Scalia expressed such displeasure with the manner in which the FCC reserved for
itself the ability to switch between regulation and deregulation based on its potentially
variable statutory interpretation and determination of the facts. "In other words, what the
Commission hath given, [e.g., a deregulatory decision] the Commission may well take away
[through a different interpretation of the facts and statutory language]-unless it doesn't.
This is a wonderful illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some assistance
from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic discretions." National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 1013 (2005)
(J. Scalia dissenting).
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Communications Act establishes ongoing objectives and the FCC has
established longstanding policies, such as promoting localism and
diversity in broadcasting, competition, and incentives for investment
in next generation networks. However, the means to achieve these
goals can change. For example, the FCC regularly reallocates spectrum
when technological innovations and consumer demand support a
change.52 Because the vast majority of video programming
consumption occurs via coaxial cable and satellite frequencies, the
FCC decided that it could reduce the bandwidth allocated for
broadcast television and expand the amount available for wireless
services. Similarly, the Commission has determined that it can best
promote localism and diversity in content by relaxing limitations on
vertical and horizontal integration by incumbents, in light of
technological innovations that provide new competitive options, e.g.,
Internet-delivered services.53 Simply put, the FCC can change its mind
on its own initiative, or in response to rulemaking petitions of
incumbent and new stakeholders.
Establishing cable operator must-carry requirements, treating
VolP operators as the functional equivalent of telephone companies,
and mandating roaming agreement negotiations arguably represent
prudent policy changes in response to changed circumstances and
within the scope of latitude created by general statutory mandates and
deferential courts. Such flexibility can help the FCC remedy mistakes
it has made in overestimating the likelihood of sustainable
competition, perhaps having relied too much on stakeholder advocacy
and sponsored research, as well as economic doctrine and even
wishful thinking.
When the FCC abdicated near complete responsibility for
overseeing the information services marketplace, either it
conscientiously concluded that the marketplace could self-regulate, or
it adopted politically expedient policies. Perhaps the Commission
could not have reasonably anticipated that an ISP might act on its
ability and incentive to block subscriber traffic or that a telephone
company might block its DSL customers from accessing VoIP
52 See, e.g., Third Periodic Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the
Conversion to Digital Television, 23 F.C.C.R. 2994 (2007) (assigning more spectrum for
wireless data services by reallocating portions of spectrum allocated for broadcast
television in light of the ability of new digital technology to accommodate all broadcaster
requirements using less bandwidth).
53 See, e.g., In the Matter of 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review- Review of the
Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 26 F.C.C.R. 17489 (2011).
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carriers.54 Facing stakeholder conflicts and requests for its "good
offices" to resolve disputes, the FCC has fashioned new quasi-common
carrier obligations for ventures whose managers probably thought
they were free of such government oversight. Depending on the duty
imposed and the extent to which the FCC can identify a relevant direct
or indirect statutory mandate, reviewing courts may validate the
imposition of quasi-common carrier duties. On occasion, Congress
endorses the FCC's initiative by enacting laws that solidify the
legitimacy of the Commission's decision. For example, following the
FCC's lead from decades earlier, Congress enacted laws creating a new
section in the Communications Act authorizing cable television
regulations, responsibilities, and rights,55 including the option of
negotiating for space on poles of power and telephone companies.
Congress also explicitly authorized the FCC to reduce common carrier
regulatory burdens, e.g., the duty to file public tariffs, after a reviewing
court invalidated the FCC's attempts to deregulate.56
VIII. MISSION CREEP VERSUS LACK OF LEGISLATIVE CLARITY
Opponents to proliferating quasi-common carrier requirements
can frame the FCC's actions as unlawful extensions of its regulatory
wingspan masquerading as reasonable statutory interpretation.
Supreme Court Justice Scalia warned that, if accorded too much
judicial deference, the FCC can exploit such flexibility to overstep its
lawful authority, as well as create uncertainty about the permissible
scope of its oversight:
In other words, what the Commission hath given, the
Commission may well take away-unless it doesn't. This
54 See Madison River Communications, L.L.C., Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295,4297 (2005)
(small independent telephone company agreed to a $15,ooo monetary forfeiture and
consent decree agreeing not to block Digital Subscriber Line customers' access to Voice
over the Internet Protocol telephone services).
55 See Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Title VI, codified at 47 U.S.C. §521-573.
56 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (1985) (determining that Sec.
203 of the Communications Act mandates tariff filing). The Telecommunications Act of
1996 provides the FCC with statutory authority to eliminate the tariff filing obligations of
selected types of Title II regulated carriers. "Any telecommunications carrier, or class of
telecommunications carriers, may submit a petition to the Commission requesting that the
Commission exercise the authority granted under this section with respect to that carrier
or those carriers, or any service offered by that carrier or carriers." 47 U.S.C. § 16o(c)
(2012).
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is a wonderful illustration of how an experienced
agency can (with some assistance from credulous
courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic
discretions. The main source of the Commission's
regulatory authority over common carriers is Title II,
but the Commission has rendered that inapplicable in
this instance by concluding that the definition of
"telecommunications service" is ambiguous and does
not apply to cable-modem service. It contemplates,
however, altering that (unnecessary) outcome, not by
changing the law (i.e., its construction of the Title II
definitions), but by reserving the right to change the
facts. Under its undefined and sparingly used
"ancillary" powers, the Commission might conclude
that it can order cable companies to "unbundle" the
telecommunications component of cable-modem
service. And presto, Title II will then apply to them,
because they will finally be "offering"
telecommunications service! . . . Such M6bius-strip
reasoning mocks the principle that the statute
constrains the agency in any meaningful way.57
Despite his concern for regulatory creep, Justice Scalia recently
wrote a majority decision that bolsters the Chevron doctrine and
supports regulatory flexibility within a federal agency's jurisdictional
reach.s8 In a case affirming the FCC's lawful authority to determine
what constitutes a reasonable amount of time for municipal
authorities to consider applications to construct towers for wireless
services, Justice Scalia rejected any distinction between a federal
agency's assessment whether it has jurisdiction to decide a matter, i.e.,
the power to act, and instances where the agency decides to take
action.59 The majority decision also rejects the rationale that, because
57 National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967,
1013, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2718 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
s8 See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, _ U.S. _, No. 11-1545, slip. op. (May 20, 2013);
available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1545_1b7d.pdf
[hereinafter, Arlington Wireless].
59 "No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory authority." Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). "In sum, judges
should not waste their time in the mental acrobatics needed to decide whether an agency's
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state and municipal authorities traditionally have made tower site
decisions, courts should prevent a federal agency from getting
involved. The decision rejects this federalism argument, as well, on
grounds that the FCC acted based on its statutory authority to make
rules.6o
The FCC can make necessary and pragmatic mid-course
corrections, such as creating quasi-common carrier burdens, if it can
make convincing arguments that the targeted ventures do not have
absolute and unimpeachable statutorily conferred immunity from
regulation. Arguably, the FCC conferred such immunity when it
determined that all broadband Internet access providers qualified for
the deregulatory safe harbor established by Congress when it created
the information service definition. Accepting its view that a service has
to fit within one, and only one, regulatory classification, the FCC
might have to refrain from imposing anything that conditions and
dilutes the deregulatory safe harbor established by Congress for
qualified ventures. Put more simply, if Congress determined that ISPs
operate in sufficiently competitive markets, or offer non-essential
services, then the FCC would presumably lack statutory authority to
impose rules and requirements based on the view that these ventures
cannot self-regulate, or that they provide services now requiring
consumer safeguards.
On the other hand, Arlington Wireless provides some latitude for
a regulatory agency to make adjustments, provided the statute does
not offer absolute clarity. Congress has not responded to the
technological and marketplace convergence that has occurred since
the last major substantive amendment of the Communications Act of
1934, which took place in 1996. Congress has also not mandated
mutual exclusivity in terms of regulatory oversight between a venture
that offers telecommunications services and one that offers
information services. Convergence all but guarantees that companies
will offer a diverse array of services that combine telecommunications
and information services, even as a single Internet conduit can
transmit them all. Under these changed and volatile circumstances,
interpretation of a statutory provision is 'jurisdictional' or 'nonjurisdictional.' Once those
labels are sheared away, it becomes clear that the question in every case is, simply, whether
the statutory text forecloses the agency's assertion of authority, or not." Id. at 9.
6 0 "But this case has nothing to do with federalism. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) explicitly
supplants state authority by requiring zoning authorities to render a decision 'within a
reasonable period of time,' and the meaning of that phrase is indisputably a question of
federal law." Id. at 14. (emphasis added).
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the FCC might make a convincing argument that it needs to revise its
demarcation between regulated and unregulated services.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the Comcast and Cellco decisions may not offer a
clear sense of whether and how the FCC can create new duties on
private carriers, including ISPs. The Comcast case appears as a strong
judicial rebuke for creative statutory interpretation, particularly the
extension of Title I ancillary jurisdiction. Yet the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequently revalidated the quasi-common carrier option by
affirming the FCC's imposition of a duty to deal between cellular
telephone companies, even for mobile Internet access that clearly
constitutes an information service. 61
Perhaps the distinction can be explained by the fact that the FCC
imposed the data roaming interconnection obligation solely on
carriers that use radio spectrum, while the Commission sanctioned
Comcast, an ISP that provides Internet access via wire. If this
distinction matters, then the FCC might not secure judicial deference
for the imposition of quasi-common carrier duties on both types of
ISPs, because the wire-based operators do not trigger a sufficient link
to Title III of the Communications Act. Under this reasoning the FCC
probably could not deem network neutrality and open Internet access
rules as quasi-common carriage applicable to any type of information
service provider.
However, the wireline/wireless dichotomy might not prove a fail-
safe differentiator in all cases. For example, at some future date,
incumbent carriers will complete a migration from voice telephone
service using copper wires to next generation service using copper and
fiber optic wires, as well as wireless media.62 The FCC might make a
compelling argument for imposing quasi-common carrier obligations
to provide still necessary consumer safeguards, even if the new
services largely or fully constitute information services.
61 In Arlington Wireless, the Supreme Court established yet another precedent of judicial
deference to federal agency expertise, including the flexibility to make adjustments to the
scope of its regulatory oversight.
62 See AT&T Petition to Launch a Proceeding Concerning the TDM-to-IP Transition, GM
Docket No. 12-353, available at:
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7022o86o871 see also, Public Notice, FCC
Announces First Technology Transitions Policy Task Force Workshop. Technologies
Transitions Policy Task Force, GN Docket No. 13-5, available at:
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-13-192-A.docx.
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Even if one can understand and justify the differences in outcomes
between the Comcast and Cellco decisions, two problems will still vex
the FCC. First, the Commission will continue to confront conflicts
between ventures that have introduced new services that do not
readily and fully fit within one-and only one-statutory service
definition contained in the Communications Act. Second, the FCC will
continue considering whether to fashion creative and ad hoc
justifications in response to complaints submitted by aggrieved
consumers and carriers. Even well intentioned attempts to resolve
conflicts may come across as a ploy to expand the Commission's scope
of regulatory responsibility.
In fashioning quasi-common carrier responsibilities, the FCC has
attempted to calibrate the degree of compulsory cooperation and
facilities interconnection according to how much the public interest
will be served by such mandated duties to deal. The FCC has refrained
from imposing the full array of common carrier responsibilities,
affording the reluctant party in particular the opportunity to impose
commercially driven terms, conditions, and prices. In the matter of
data roaming, the reluctant party can also explore whether to refuse
interconnection based on technical infeasibility.
Going forward, perhaps the FCC has sufficient understanding of
how to calibrate carrier duties effectively without imposing full
common carrier responsibilities. However, the Commission will have
to make this decision based on different facts each and every time a
direct statutory link does not exist. Likewise, the FCC will have to
evaluate each new and different blend of technological, business,
political, consumer protection and public interest factors.
Stakeholders can reasonably complain about the lack of certainty, but
to achieve greater clarity, Congress will have to revisit and revise the
Communications Act, a task it rarely perform
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